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HOMELESS AND HUNGRY:                        
DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO SHARE FOOD 
Sydney Rosenblum* 
ABSTRACT 
There is an alarming trend in cities in the United States to pass 
ordinances that criminalize homelessness.  These ordinances outlaw 
typical acts that a homeless person must engage in to survive.  In 
recent years, many cities have employed a new tactic – enacting food 
sharing ordinances.  Food sharing ordinances target both homeless 
persons and organizations that attempt to share food with them.  
These food sharing ordinances discourage people from sharing food 
with homeless persons by requiring many steps before being able to 
legally do so.  This increases the number of people who are hungry, 
leaving many in even more need than before. 
Drawing from recent litigation in the Eleventh Circuit’s case of 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, this 
Note examines potential arguments for constitutional protections 
supporting the homeless population’s right to food and the providers’ 
right to share food.  This Note urges courts to utilize the whole-text 
approach to constitutional interpretation to protect the homeless.  
Doing so is legally sound and safeguards the homeless from a policy 
perspective.  Further, this Note discusses how the United States’ 
participation in certain international agreements also lends support to 
such protection. 
 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2017, University of 
Michigan. The author would like to thank Professor Abner Greene, for his insight 
and guidance, Fordham Urban Law Journal editors and staff for their hard work, and 
her family and friends for their unwavering support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is smiling in Stranahan Park in Fort Lauderdale.  Tables 
are lined up and filled with an abundance of food.  Volunteers have 
come to communicate a message to both the local government and 
the general population about homelessness in the city, by distributing 
food to the hungry.  But the smiles do not last long.  Police begin to 
swarm the park and cite the volunteers for misdemeanors.1  The 
volunteers violated a local city ordinance that limits “food sharing”2 
on city-owned property, because they did not satisfy a list of required 
conditions and therefore were not granted access to use the park for 
 
 1. “A person convicted of a violation of this Code, shall be punished by a fine 
not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for a term not to 
exceed sixty (60) days or by both such fine and imprisonment.” FORT LAUDERDALE, 
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1-6(c) (2018). 
 2. “Food sharing” refers to distributing food free of charge, to anyone who 
chooses to participate.  It is also the action that takes place at “outdoor food 
distribution centers.”  FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CODE art. III, § 47-18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014). 
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that purpose.3  This situation led to the dispute in Fort Lauderdale 
Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale.4 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs exemplifies how local 
government has taken unconstitutional action against the hungry by 
forbidding volunteers from sharing food with them.  This restrictive 
practice has detrimental impacts on the hungry and is just another 
example of the government’s attempt to criminalize5 the portion of 
the population that is already stuck in poverty.  This type of 
criminalization is constitutionally problematic under the First 
Amendment’s freedom of expressive conduct and under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
Part I of this Note provides contextual information about poverty 
in the United States, clarifies how food sharing ordinances fit into the 
larger context of actions taken to criminalize the homeless 
population, and explains the importance of Fort Lauderdale Food 
Not Bombs.  Part II explores constitutional arguments that both were 
made and could have been made in Fort Lauderdale Food Not 
Bombs to protect the constitutional rights of the homeless.  It focuses 
on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and explains which 
arguments, in light of the case’s facts, would be the most persuasive 
on remand or in future litigation of this type.  Part III urges courts6 to 
consider the whole text of the U.S. Constitution, policy implications 
 
 3. Id.  The city ordinance imposed restrictions on location and contained 
requirements regarding food handling and safety.  In addition, under the ordinance, 
Stranahan Park is zoned to require a condition use permit.  Therefore, individuals 
and organizations can only use the park for the purpose of it being a social service 
facility, if they satisfy the permit requirements as well. 
 4. 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 5. The word “criminalize” refers to the type of action that is taken against the 
homeless, in a broader context.  Specifically, for food sharing ordinances, volunteers, 
not the homeless, are the ones that are technically criminalized.  However, scholars 
classify food sharing ordinances as an action that “criminalizes the homeless” due to 
the detrimental impact they have on that segment of the population.  Therefore, this 
Note does the same.  See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING 
NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 
26, https://nlchp.org//wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Housing-Not-Handcuffs.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/XS2A-GQ4X] (“It should be noted that food sharing bans are 
unique among criminalization ordinances in that they impose liability on homeless 
service providers and other individuals, rather than on homeless people themselves.  
In this way, a reduction of food sharing bans do[es] not directly reduce 
criminalization of homelessness.”). 
 6. It is important to note that many scholars find judicial activism problematic in 
a political democracy.  But see Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence 
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1218 (1987) (“[T]he 
framers actually intended to invest in judges the responsibility for giving content to 
the farmers’ highly general directives.”). 
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of these ordinances, and the United States’ involvement in 
international agreements to ultimately protect the rights of both the 
food sharing organizations and the homeless population. 
I. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CRIMINALIZE THE HOMELESS 
This Part explains how the situation in Fort Lauderdale Food Not 
Bombs fits into the larger context of many cities’ constant effort to 
criminalize the homeless.  Section I.A. provides a contextual and 
statistical analysis of poverty in the United States.  Section I.B. details 
how cities attempt to criminalize the homeless.  Section I.C. describes 
food sharing ordinances and their overall impact on the hungry.  
Section I.D. depicts Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs. 
A. Poverty in the United States 
Context is essential when considering poverty law.  This is because 
the ways in which one defines poverty, one’s beliefs and opinions 
about struggling persons, and government responses to the poor all 
shape how a person understands the problems that arise out of 
poverty. 
Poverty can be defined as “a level of income below the threshold 
considered necessary to achieve a sufficient standard of living.”7  It is 
important to discuss poverty in terms of “relative deprivation,” which 
is defined as the absence or inadequacy of those diets, amenities, 
standards, services, and activities that are common or customary in 
that society.8  In 2017, the official poverty rate in the United States 
was 12.3%, meaning that 39.7 million people were living in poverty.9  
Although evidence shows that overall poverty rates are declining,10 
 
 7. Poverty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Poverty, MERRIAM 
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/poverty 
[https://perma.cc/9P7T-X8EY] (last visited June 1, 2019) (defining poverty as “the 
state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable amount of money or material 
possessions”). 
 8. JULIET M. BRODIE ET AL., POVERTY LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 2014).  Absolute mobility compares, in absolute terms, how well an 
individual does in relation to his or her parents. Id. at 3.  The measures are based on 
the bare minimum required for a person or family to meet basic needs, independent 
of the relative wealth of the surrounding community. Id. 
 9. KAYLA FONTENOT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2017 11 (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-
263.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY8M-NJPT]. 
 10. Id.  The poverty rate fell 2.5% since 2014, making it the third consecutive 
annual decline. Id. 
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the effects of poverty continue to severely and disproportionately 
affect certain subgroups of the population, including single-parent 
households and minority neighborhoods.11 
There is strong statistical evidence12 that parents’ income will affect 
their children’s future income, causing rates of relative 
intergenerational mobility to be flat.13  In terms of absolute mobility, 
in the last few decades, there has been a sharp decline, meaning that 
most Americans did not surpass their parents’ family income.14  
Additionally, geographic location is important for mobility.15  
Children who move away from low-mobility areas the earliest and the 
fastest receive the greatest benefits.16  There is even a gender gap, as 
in some ways, boys may feel the effects of poverty more acutely than 
girls.17  Further, education can positively affect a child’s trajectory.18  
Specifically, a college education can radically reduce the correlation 
between parents’ incomes and their children’s future incomes.19  Yet, 
a child’s likelihood of going to college after high school is correlated 
to household income.20  Moreover, poverty even has concrete effects 
on a person’s longevity.21   Due to persistent systemic inequities, 
these conditions and circumstances are often well beyond the control 
of the children they inevitably affect. Thus, is poverty really a choice? 
 
 11. John Cassidy, Relatively Deprived, NEW YORKER (Apr. 3, 2006), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/03/relatively-deprived 
[https://perma.cc/F5C8-Q7QV] (“It would be one thing if poverty hit at random, and 
no one group were singled out . . . [i]t is another thing to realize that some seem 
destined to poverty almost from birth- by their color or by the economic status or 
occupation of their parents.” (quoting Mollie Orshansky, Children of the Poor, SOC. 
SECURITY BULL. July 1963, at 3.). 
 12. Richard V. Reeves & Eleanor Krause, Raj Chetty in 14 Charts: Big Findings 
on Opportunity Mobility We Should All Know, BROOKINGS (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2018/01/11/raj-chetty-in-14-
charts-big-findings-on-opportunity-and-mobility-we-should-know/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Z5J-Y5X3].  See infra notes 13–21 and accompanying text. 
 13. Reeves & Kraus, supra note 12. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. There are significant differences in upward mobility rates across places in 
the country. Id.  For example, mobility is slower in the South and Midwest compared 
to other regions. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. For example, growing up in Baltimore City reduced boys’ household 
income by 27.9%. Id.  Additionally, boys born poor are less likely to work than girls 
in similar situations. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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The poor have been classified in two ways: as undeserving or 
deserving persons.22  Undeserving poor persons do not “deserve” 
sympathy from society, because they brought their poverty on 
themselves through perceived behavioral or moral deficiencies.23  
This view attempts to justify America’s callous treatment of the poor 
by neither providing needed services nor compassion to this segment 
of the population.24  However, there are other explanations of 
poverty besides personal failure.25  Deserving poor persons are those 
who are poor due to unfortunate or inevitable circumstances that are 
no fault of their own.26  The deserving poor are in poverty because of 
“forces that are much larger and more powerful than they are.”27 
Overall, statistical evidence28 proves that collectively, those facing 
poverty are not doing so as a choice.  Unfortunately, “there are very 
high, structural barriers to social mobility in the U.S.,” but “these 
barriers are not insurmountable, and can be lowered through the 
sustained application of good policies.”29  However, most cities do not 
have “good policies” in place. 
B. Criminalization of the Homeless 
People living in poverty face disproportionate exposure to criminal 
sanctions through homelessness.30  Homeless people are eleven times 
 
 22. Khiara M. Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and Class-
Based Affirmative Action, 66 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1075 (2017); Jaime Alison Lee, 
Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 101 (2015). 
 23. Bridges, supra note 22, at 1078  (“These persons are not poor because the 
fates dealt them an unfortunate hand.  An illness has not incapacitated them.  Age 
has not made their bodies incapable of productive labor.  Quite the contrary, the 
undeserving poor are persons of sound mind and body. They are simply lazy or 
otherwise averse to work, promiscuous, incapable of delaying gratification, criminally 
inclined, predisposed to addiction and vice.  In essence, they are poor because of 
flaws in their characters or ethical codes.”). 
 24. Lee, supra note 22. 
 25. Bridges, supra note 22, at 1076. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  (noting that the “deserving poor” are often in poverty  “because they were 
born disabled or became disabled (through an accident that was in no way 
attributable to recklessness or negligence on their part), because they have become 
too old to work, [or] because they were stricken with an illness that robbed them of 
their savings or their ability to earn a living”). 
 28. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text (detailing the factors that affect 
the mobility of those stuck in poverty). 
 29. Reeves & Krause, supra note 12. 
 30. BRODIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 567; Donald Saelinger, Nowhere to Go: The 
Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 545, 553 (2007) (“[P]enalties exceed a homeless person’s ability to pay, and 
they thus have the effect of lengthening the individual’s criminal record, increasing 
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more likely than members of the general population to be 
incarcerated.31  The definition of “homelessness” includes, broadly, 
individuals who “experience a spell of being without a home during a 
given one-year period.”32  According to the U.S. Housing and Urban 
Development’s Annual Homeless Report to Congress, 553,742 
persons experienced homelessness on a single night in 2017.33  It is 
evident that homelessness is a pervasive problem in the United 
States.34 
There is a common misperception that everyone who is in poverty 
is homeless and vice versa.35  However, regardless of a person’s 
technical classification, the portion of the population that is homeless 
on any given night no longer receives humane treatment.36  Cities 
have adopted anti-nuisance laws to attempt to make the homeless 
population “less visible and less intrusive to urban residential and 
business communities.”37  Cities and states have criminalized typical 
acts that homeless persons must partake in.38  Hence, by engaging in 
basic life activities, the homeless are now deemed to be breaking the 
 
his debt to the city, or forcing him or her to leave the city out of fear of further 
prosecution.”); see infra notes 248–49 and accompanying text. 
 31. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 5, at 19. 
 32. Saelinger, supra note 30, at 547. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2017 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 1, 8, 9 (2017), 
https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2017-AHAR-Part-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4DJY-W96L].  There was an estimated increase of 0.7% in the 
homeless population since 2016. Id. 
 34. In 2018, Sesame Street, a show that prides itself on staying current with its 
storylines, introduced Lily, its first character, to experience homelessness. Jacqueline 
Howard, Sesame Street Muppet Becomes First to Experience Homelessness, CNN 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/12/health/sesame-street-homeless-
muppet-bn/index.html [https://perma.cc/VA25-QJQA].  Lily was originally just food 
insecure but now the show portrays her as struggling with homelessness as well. Id.  
“With any of our initiatives, our hope is that we’re not only reaching the children who 
can identify with that Muppet but that we’re also helping others to have greater 
empathy and understanding of the issue.” Id. 
 35. Saelinger, supra note 30, at 547. 
 36. Id. at 545. 
 37. Id. 
 38. These typical acts can be defined as “quality-of-life offenses” and include: 
sleeping, sitting, or storing property in public spaces, panhandling, and peddling. Id. 
at 551.  Due to the lack of private property available to these persons, anything the 
law does to regulate public property inevitably affects them. Jeremy Waldron, Essay, 
Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 296 (1991) 
(“Everything that is done has to be done somewhere.  No one is free to perform an 
action unless there is somewhere to perform it.”). 
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law.39  This criminalization creates a pipeline to prison for those who 
are already in need, and therefore is counter-productive.40 
Myths41 surrounding the issue of homelessness result in people 
accepting false narratives and supporting the passage of laws that 
criminalize homeless persons and volunteers.42  Correcting the 
misconceptions surrounding homelessness could go a long way 
toward ending the mistreatment of the homeless in the United 
States.43  But now, city and state legislatures are enacting laws to 
criminalize the homeless, and the judiciary is arguably experiencing 
compassion fatigue by “appear[ing] less willing to uphold individual 
rights for the homeless.”44 
 
 39. ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, YALE LAW SCH., 
FORCED INTO BREAKING THE LAW: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN 
CONNECTICUT 19 (2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/criminalization_of_homelessness_r
eport_for_web_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5XZ-K4NW].  “Without housing, 
performing life-sustaining functions becomes a criminal act that can carry dangerous 
consequences.” Id. at 20. 
 40. See infra notes 248–49 and accompanying text. 
 41. Common myths include: “Hunger is not a problem for homeless individuals 
because there are plenty of food pantries and soup kitchens; SNAP/Food Stamp 
benefits are easily accessible to people who are homeless and many homeless people 
take advantage of this program; sharing food with people in outdoor locations 
enables them to remain homeless.” NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., A 
PLACE AT THE TABLE: PROHIBITIONS ON SHARING FOOD WITH PEOPLE 
EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS 8–9 (2010), 
https://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/Food_Sharing_2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XVZ2-ZPMC]; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, FOOD-SHARING 
REPORT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF EFFORTS TO FEED PEOPLE IN NEED 7 (Oct. 2014), 
https://nationalhomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Food-Sharing2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQF3-Q7EZ] (including another myth that “if you stop feeding 
them, they will disappear”). 
 42. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., A PLACE AT THE TABLE, supra note 
41, at 8.  See also NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 25, 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/YWU3-KX3Q] 
(“The theories surrounding food sharing restrictions are not supported by evidence 
of the feared harms.  Indeed, they are not supported by common sense.”). 
 43. Andrew J. Liese, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as 
Violations of State Substantive Due Process Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1419–20 
(2006). 
 44. Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the 
Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 266 (1994).  This 
results in “rendering the homeless constitutional castaways.” Id. 
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C. Continuing the Trend of Criminalization Through the Use of 
Food Sharing Ordinances 
Not only are homeless individuals criminalized for engaging in life-
sustaining activities, but cities are also criminalizing volunteers for 
publicly engaging in food sharing with the homeless.45  Though food 
sharing bans are commonly referred to as a criminalization of the 
homeless population, this type of ban more broadly affects the larger 
portion of the population that is hungry, regardless of whether they 
are homeless.46  In other words, the ordinances specifically affect the 
segment of the population that is “food insecure.”47 
In 2017, forty million people in the United States, including more 
than twelve million children, struggled with hunger.48  On a daily 
basis, one out of every six Americans goes hungry.49  Addressing 
hunger is crucial, as it causes innumerable physical, mental, and 
emotional health consequences that can significantly worsen if they 
are not addressed.50  Food sharing ordinances are no help, as they 
encourage society to take steps in the wrong direction by 
criminalizing hunger.51 
Limitations on the ability to share food with the homeless are 
rooted in permit requirements, zoning restrictions, and the practice of 
selectively enforcing ordinances.52  Since 2013, over thirty cities have 
tried to restrict practices of sharing food with those experiencing 
homelessness.53  Six percent of cities restrict food sharing.54 
 
 45. See, e.g., Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 46. This Note refers to the homeless and the hungry populations by using the 
words interchangeably. 
 47. Facts About Poverty and Hunger in America, FEEDING AMERICA, 
https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/facts [https://perma.cc/E5MV-
733E].  “Food insecure” can be defined as having limited or uncertain access to 
enough food to support a healthy lifestyle. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Homeless People Deserve Food Too, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
https://nationalhomeless.org/campaigns/food-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/WZ42-XRES] 
[hereinafter Homeless People Deserve Food Too]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. No Picnic in the Park, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://nationalhomeless.org/tag/food-sharing/ 
[https://perma.cc/XL4K-E96L] (“When showing compassion becomes illegal, we 
know we have a serious problem to tackle.”). 
 52. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., A PLACE AT THE TABLE, supra note 
41, at 9. 
 53. Robbie Couch, 33 Cities Have Restricted Feeding the Homeless in Past Year 
Alone: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/10/bans-on-feeding-the-
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D. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale 
The most recent federal appellate case regarding food sharing is 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs.55  Fort Lauderdale Food Not 
Bombs (FLFNB) is a non-profit organization56 that engages in 
peaceful political direct action by conducting weekly food sharing 
events at Stranahan Park, where homeless people tend to 
congregate.57  FLFNB sets up a table underneath a gazebo in the park 
and distributes vegetarian or vegan food, free of charge to anyone 
who participates, as an act of political solidarity meant to convey the 
organization’s message.58 
This litigation arose from the city enforcing, for the first time since 
February of 2015, Ordinance C-14-42 (the “Ordinance”) and Park 
Rule 2.2 (the “Rule”) against FLFNB volunteers whom were 
engaging in their normal volunteer work.59  Under the Ordinance, 
 
homeless_n_5479450.html [https://perma.cc/KL57-6E2P]; see NAT’L COAL. FOR THE 
HOMELESS, FEEDING INTOLERANCE: PROHIBITIONS ON SHARING FOOD WITH PEOPLE 
EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS (Nov. 2007), 
https://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/Food_Sharing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5PQ-2F6J] (listing which cities have implemented food sharing 
bans). 
 54. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 5, at 10. 
 55. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
 56. This Note specifically discusses the actions of the organization Fort 
Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, which is an entity of the nationwide organization Food 
Not Bombs. See FOOD NOT BOMBS, http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9JR-UMTM] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).  Additionally, there are 
hundreds of other organizations across the country that engage in non-profit work to 
share food with those in need.  These include: Feeding America, WhyHunger, and 
Share Our Strength. Hunger Relief Organizations, U.S. DEP’T AGRICULTURE, 
https://www.nal.usda.gov/fnic/hunger-relief-organizations [https://perma.cc/UD7A-
DYSH] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).  Personally, Rock and Wrap It Up! is what 
sparked my passion for helping the homeless. See ROCK AND WRAP IT UP!, 
https://www.rockandwrapitup.org [https://perma.cc/LG2A-UGV7] (last visited Dec. 
17, 2018).  It is an organization that started in my hometown and picks up prepared 
but untouched food from stadiums and concert venues around the country and 
delivers it to local shelters and soup kitchens. Id.  My family and I have been active 
members since I was a child. 
 57. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1238. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1239.  This case deals only with the City of Fort Lauderdale’s Code of 
Ordinances from 2014.  However, it is important to note that the most recent version 
of the Ordinance, updated on December 3, 2018, now includes a separate provision 
specific to outdoor social service feeding events (new provision). FORT 
LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 15, art. V, § 15-186 (Dec. 3, 2018).  
Outdoor social service feeding events are no longer under the “social service facility” 
section of the Code but rather under the general outdoor events section. Id.  The new 
provision includes most of the same requirements as the C-14-42 Amendment did in 
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outdoor food distribution centers (“OFDC”)60 are subject to 
restrictions on hours, location, food handling, and safety.61  There is 
no minimum number of members of the public who need to receive 
the meals to trigger the requirements.62  Additionally, depending on 
the specific zoning district of the OFDC, an event may be permitted, 
not permitted, or required to obtain a conditional use permit.63  Even 
if permitted, it is still subject to review by the City’s development 
review committee.64  Stranahan Park is zoned as a “Regional Activity 
Center-City Center” and requires a conditional use permit.65  To add, 
for this type of activity, the Rule states the park may not be used 
“unless authorized pursuant to a written agreement with City.”66  
Thereby, the Rule adds an additional requirement of written consent, 
on top of approval by the City’s development review committee, to 
allow FLFNB to distribute its food in the park.67 
FLFNB claims that it does not share food as a charity, but rather 
does so to communicate its message “that society can end hunger and 
poverty if we redirect our collective resources from the military and 
war and that food is a human right, not a privilege, which society has 
a responsibility to provide for all.”68  Further, FLFNB alleges that the 
 
2014. Id.  The main difference is that there is now a minimum number of people 
(fifteen) to trigger the requirement to obtain a zoning permit. Id.  If the number of 
people exceeds fifteen then the requirements are the same as those in C-14-42, and 
include a detailed application, and a list of stipulations about hours, location, 
sanitation and safety. Compare FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
15, art. V, § 15-186 (Dec. 3, 2018), with FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014).  It is unclear whether the 
new provision was in place in 2014 when C-14-42 was adopted to interpret what 
“social service facility” included as per Section 47-18.31.  Regardless, the 
constitutional arguments are still identical. 
 60. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(B)(4) (2014). 
 61. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014). 
 62. Id.; Initial Brief for Appellant at 7–9, Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. 
City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-16808). See supra 
note 59 and accompanying text. 
 63. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014); Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1239. 
 64. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1239. 
 65. Id. 
 66. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., PARK RULES AND REGULATIONS 2.2, 
https://www.fortlauderdale.gov/home/showdocument?id=2908 
[https://perma.cc/S78T-NK89]. 
 67. Id.  In other words, just because written consent is obtained does not mean 
Zoning Ordinance C-14-42 can be disregarded; all other specific use requirements 
still must be met, and vice versa. 
 68. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1240. 
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Ordinance and the Rule violate its right to free speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.69  FLFNB relies on the fact that sharing food is 
one of the oldest forms of human expression and the context of the 
situation portrays the message to a reasonable viewer.70  
Furthermore, FLFNB points out the City’s malicious reasoning for 
and malicious effects of implementing the laws at issue.71 
On the other hand, the City contends that the food sharing events 
are not expressive conduct, because the act of feeding is not 
inherently communicative of FLFNB’s “intended, unique and 
particularized message.”72  Additionally, the City explains that even if 
the food sharing is deemed subject to First Amendment protection, 
the two laws at issue are valid and include reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions.73  This is because the City’s regulations promote 
its “substantial and compelling governmental interests in protecting 
the peace, health, safety and property of its citizens.”74 
The Eleventh Circuit held that FLFNB’s actions were expressive 
conduct.75  The court explained that, on remand, the district court will 
need to determine whether the Ordinance and Rule violated the First 
Amendment.76  This Note uses this case’s facts to explore this issue, 
among other constitutional challenges that could have been brought 
to protect the volunteers and the hungry. 
II. FOOD SHARING AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Homeless rights advocates have been creative in their increasingly 
numerous challenges to laws aimed at criminalizing the homeless.77  
Unfortunately, their failures greatly outnumber their successes.78  
Section II.A. discusses how the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
 
 69. Id. at 1239. 
 70. Brief for Appellant at 20 & 29, Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of 
Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-16808). 
 71. Id. at 41.  “Food sharing is presumptively prohibited in all City parks and on 
all City sidewalks, and there is no public place in the City where FLFNB is lawfully 
allowed to engage in their political demonstrations that includes sharing food as 
symbolic expression.” Id. at 42. 
 72. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis added). 
 73. Brief for Appellee at 40, Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-16808). 
 74. Id. at 45.  Further, the City wants to ensure the homeless are fed in safe, 
secure, and sanitary conditions. Id.  The City also wants to preserve the ability for its 
parks to be used by all. Id. 
 75. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1245. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Liese, supra note 43, at 1454. 
 78. Id. 
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freedom of expressive conduct protects the volunteers’ actions.  
Section II.B.1. analyzes the argument for employing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to protect the hungry.  Section 
II.B.2. considers how the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause can be used to safeguard the homeless. 
A. Interpreting the First Amendment’s Right to Expressive 
Conduct79 
Under the First Amendment, speech is not limited to verbal or 
written communication.80  Protection has been granted to expressive 
conduct that qualifies as “symbolic speech.”81  Hence, the First 
Amendment guarantees all people the right to engage in expressive 
conduct.82  Only two circuits, the Eleventh Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit, have analyzed whether food sharing is inherently expressive 
conduct.83 
First, it is important to consider whether the Eleventh Circuit was 
correct in holding that FLFNB’s conduct is expressive.  Although 
there has been disagreement as to what qualifies as expressive, U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent establishes a two-step test to help 
 
 79. Another argument that could be made using the First Amendment is 
regarding the right to expressive association, which is the right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in activities that are protected by the First Amendment. See 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  Due to the lack of a restriction on 
associational membership or leadership in Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, the 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees line of reasoning is not applicable to the situation at 
hand.  Therefore, there would be no significant distinction between the expressive 
conduct analysis and the expressive association analysis because a generally 
applicable law with facially legitimate ends affects the right of expressive association 
no more or less than it affects any individual who wants to use the park.  If the City’s 
ordinance unconstitutionally limits the expressive conduct of FLFNB, then it does so 
whether or not the organization is an association of one person or multiple persons.  
Thus, expressive association is not discussed in this Note. 
 80. Caleb Detweiler, Breaking Bread and the Law: Criminalizing Homelessness 
and the First Amendment Rights in Public Parks, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 695, 710 (2017); 
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2005). 
 81. Detweiler, supra note 80. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the conduct is expressive); First Vagabonds Church of 
God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) (circumventing the question of 
whether the conduct is expressive); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa 
Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing whether food distribution is on its 
face expressive activity, but not deciding on the issue); McHenry v. Agnos, No. 92-
15123, 1993 WL 8728 (9th Cir. 1993) (circumventing the question of whether the 
conduct is expressive). 
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determine what is protected.84  As laid out in Spence v. Washington, 
for conduct to be sufficiently expressive, there needs to be (1) “an 
intent to convey a particularized message,” and it must be the case 
that (2) “in the surrounding circumstances[,] the likelihood was great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”85  
Since then, the Court has clarified that a “narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,” 
and thus is not the meaning of particularized.86  Therefore, in 
determining whether conduct is expressive, the question is “whether 
the reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message, not 
whether an observer would necessarily infer a specific message.”87  
FLFNB clearly intended to convey a particularized message.88  Thus, 
the critical question is whether the reasonable person would interpret 
FLFNB’s food sharing events as some sort of message. 
Applying the objective second part of the Spence test often 
requires looking at facts surrounding the speech in question.89  
Context helps differentiate between activity that is sufficiently 
expressive and similar activity that is not.90  In this situation, five 
circumstances arguably make FLFNB’s events expressive.91  First, at 
FLFNB events, the organization not only sets up tables and banners, 
but also distributes literature.92  Second, the food sharing events are 
open to everyone, which has social implications.93  Third, the food 
sharing is held in Stranahan Park, a public park located near city 
 
 84. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). 
 85. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
 86. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 87. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1240; Holloman ex rel. 
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004); Laurie Magid, First 
Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467, 487 (1984).  
This Note focuses on using the more relaxed standard; however, some courts still 
require a “particularized” message. 
 88. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1240. 
 89. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“In characterizing such action for 
First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred.”). 
See also Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
 90. Magid, supra note 87, at 487–91.  Courts have considered a variety of indicia 
in analyzing observer understanding: time and locale, current events, media attention, 
verbal or written explanations and the use of recognized symbols. Id. 
 91. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1242–43.  These five reasons 
are what the Eleventh Circuit relies on in reaching its decision. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1242. 
 93. Id. 
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government buildings.94  This park is known by both parties to be a 
traditional public forum.95  Fourth, the treatment of the City’s 
homeless population is an issue of concern in the community.96  The 
City admits that its elected officials held a public workshop on the 
“homeless issue” in January of 2014.97  Fifth, FLFNB uses the sharing 
of food as the means of conveying its message.98  Additionally, the 
Eleventh Circuit recognized that sharing food is one of the oldest 
forms of human expression.99 
Even if every other incidence of food sharing is deemed not to be 
expressive, this situation is and should continue to be deemed so.  
Conduct does not lose its expressive nature just because it is also 
accompanied by other speech.100  Regardless, in this situation, any 
explanatory speech, including the text and logo contained on 
FLFNB’s banner, is not needed to convey a message.101  Hence, the 
reasonable observer at FLFNB’s events would infer some sort of 
message based off of the activity.102 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  Public parks have been used as a forum for communicating ideas. 
Detweiler, supra note 80, at 698; Hague v. Cmty. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939) (explaining that parks “have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”). 
 96. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1242. 
 97. Id.  A relevant contextual indication of observer understanding is the 
existence of a “contemporaneous issue of intense public concern.” Magid, supra note 
87, at 489.  The public workshop is evidence that the issue of homelessness was of 
important public concern at that time.  Therefore, observers are more likely to view 
the conduct as communicative. Id. 
 98. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1243; see supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 70.  The history of a particular 
symbol or type of conduct is instructive in determining whether the reasonable 
observer may infer some message when viewing it. Id. 
 100. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1244. But see Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (holding that the conduct 
was not expressive because speech was necessary to provide an explanation for the 
law school’s conduct as the point of requiring military interviews away from the law 
school is not overwhelmingly apparent that the law school is expressing disapproval 
of the military). 
 101. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1244.  The words may be 
required for onlookers to recognize a specific message that public money should be 
spent on providing food for the poor rather than funding the military, but it is enough 
if the reasonable observer would interpret the food sharing events as conveying some 
sort of message. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 
(11th Cir. 2004); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 102. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1244.  At the very least an 
observer would interpret the event as communicating a message of solidarity and 
social unity. See Initial Brief for Appellant, supra note 62, at 31.  Additionally, 
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On the other hand, one could argue, similarly to the analysis 
presented in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, 103 that feeding people in the park is too ambiguous to allow a 
conclusion that an objective reasonable observer would understand 
that the volunteers are trying to convey a particular message.104  That 
message would not be understood without the explanatory speech 
included in FLFNB’s banners in the park, and therefore the conduct 
is not inherently expressive.105  In other words, 
[w]ithout the assistance of explanatory speech, an objective 
reasonable observer would not know whether the group feeding was 
a family having a reunion, a church intending to engage in a purely 
charitable act, a restraint distributing surplus food for free instead of 
throwing it away, or an organization trying to engage in a form of 
political speech.106 
However, the standard is that a reasonable onlooker is able to infer 
some message, and for this reason, it is irrelevant what particular 
message is conveyed.  Therefore, although the banners are helpful in 
portraying FLFNB’s specific message, they are not necessary to 
understand that some message is trying to be illustrated.107  The 
 
providing basic human necessities to the homeless communicates compassion for 
those in need. Matthew M. Cummings, Comment, The Continued Illegalization of 
Compassion: United States v. Millis and Its Effects on Humanitarian Work with the 
Homeless, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 439, 452 (2011). 
 103. See generally 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 104. The expressive nature of conduct has been recognized in many U.S. Supreme 
Court cases. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (recognizing the 
expressive nature in burning the American flag on the steps of the Dallas City Hall to 
protest the policies of the Regan administration); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (recognizing the expressive nature in sleeping outdoors 
in the winter near the vicinity of the magisterial residence of the President of the 
United States); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (recognizing the 
expressive nature in wearing American uniforms in a dramatic presentation to 
criticize American involvement in Vietnam); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (recognizing the expressive nature in students’ wearing 
black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam); Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (recognizing the expressive nature in sit-in by blacks 
in a “whites only” area to protest segregation). 
 105. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) 
(“The fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the 
conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive.”). 
 106. Detweiler, supra note 80, at 722.  In other words, deeming food sharing 
expressive conduct “misidentifies speech for a philanthropic gesture in a convenient 
location.” Id. 
 107. Initial Brief for Appellant, supra note 62 and accompanying text. See supra 
note 102 and accompanying text (explaining the different messages that an observer 
could understand from the conduct). 
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Eleventh Circuit’s analysis ended here, finding FLFNB’s conduct to 
be expressive for the same reasons that FLFNB argued. 
Although conduct may sometimes be expressive and thus 
presumptively covered by the First Amendment, the state may still 
regulate it, subject to various tests108 set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.109  The Eleventh Circuit did not engage in an analysis of state 
interest, but rather remanded the issue to the lower court.110  First, it 
must be determined whether the City’s regulation addresses 
expression.  The Ordinance and the Rule clearly do not regulate 
expression based on its content, thereby setting aside doctrine about 
content-based regulation.111  Regarding content-neutral speech 
regulation, if the Ordinance facially or as-applied addresses 
expression, then the time, place, and manner test is used.112  But, if 
the Ordinance is generally applicable, meaning it does not address 
expression on its face, but rather sometimes is applied to expressive 
conduct and sometimes to non-expressive conduct, the O’Brien test is 
preferred.113  Both tests require intermediate scrutiny, and courts are 
split on the correct analysis to apply when analyzing food sharing 
ordinances.114 
The time, place, and manner test explains that restrictions are 
justified if they are “without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech, that they [are narrowly tailored to] serve a significant 
 
 108. These tests are the time, place, and manner test, and the O’Brien test. See 
infra notes 115–16 and accompanying texts. 
 109. Detweiler, supra note 80, at 714. 
 110. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 
1245 (11th Cir. 2018). See also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 111. Although a weak argument, it can be argued that Fort Lauderdale’s 
regulations are content based as it requires the Zoning Administrator to evaluate the 
purpose or intent of an event to determine whether it is prohibited or not.  This 
discretion is required because providing food as a social service is prohibited but 
doing so for a business marketing purpose is allowed. Initial Brief for Appellant, 
supra note 62, at 37. But see Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) 
(“Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether 
to grant or deny a permit, there is risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on 
its content.  We have thus required that a time, place[,] and manner regulation 
contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to 
effective judicial review.”). 
 112. See generally Lee v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992); 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 113. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 114. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 
2011) (using both the time, place, and manner test and the O’Brien test); Santa 
Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(analyzing based on the time, place, and manner test); McHenry v. Agnos, No. 92-
15123, 1993 WL 8728 (9th Cir. 1993) (utilizing a time, place, and manner analysis). 
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governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”115 On 
the other hand, United States v. O’Brien explained that a regulation 
is sufficiently justified: 
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.116 
 
Due to the fact that these tests are used interchangeably in 
precedent with similar circumstances, this Note analyzes the 
Ordinance by using the important overlapping requirements of both 
tests.117  The corresponding requirements include: (i) the restriction 
does not regard the content of the speech,118 (ii) there is a legitimate 
government interest, and (iii) the restriction is narrowly tailored so as 
to be no greater than necessary.119  As articulated in United States v. 
O’Brien, the Court will not delve into a city’s invidious purpose for 
enactment.120  Furthermore, the Court in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism held that the government does not need to show that it used 
the least restrictive means to serve its interests, but rather that the 
means are not overbroad in relation to accomplishing the desired 
ends.121 
 
 115. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647–48; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 116. See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 117. Clark, 468 U.S. at 299, 308 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I also agree with the 
majority that no substantial difference distinguishes the test applicable to time, place, 
and manner restrictions and the test articulated in United States v. O’Brien.”); see 
also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).  This Note will also 
analyze the requirement that the ordinance leave ample alternative channels of 
communication for the speaker, even though it is only stated in the time, place, and 
manner test.  The arguments that follow in this section are arguments that should be 
made on remand or in future litigation.  In other words, they were not made in the 
litigation of Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale. 901 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 118. See supra note 111 (discussing why the Ordinance and Rule at issue do not 
regard the content of the speech). 
 119. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 120. 391 U.S. at 384.  Legislative history will not be used for this purpose. Id. 
 121. 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).  “So long as the means chosen are not substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regulation 
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First, the City’s stated purpose of the laws is to balance competing 
uses of its public property.122  The City also listed many other reasons 
in its Brief.123  These reasons are likely to be deemed to reflect a 
legitimate purpose.124  However, the numerosity of differing reasons 
leaves the real reason for enactment undefined, and homeless rights 
advocates will argue that the law is rooted in illegitimate concerns and 
bias against homeless persons.125  Further, the City had recently 
discussed the topic of homelessness at a public workshop and 
therefore could have put the laws in place for the purpose of hiding or 
clearing the city of those persons.126  However, the Court will not 
look to invidious purpose of the City, even though its underlying 
reasoning for passage may not be justifiable or constitutional.127 
Second, FLFNB will likely argue that the requirements as set forth 
in the Ordinance and Rule demand too many hurdles for an 
organization to have to go through before being able to share food 
with participants.128  The argument is that requiring these steps 
proves that the law is not narrowly tailored to the City’s goal, and 
thus overbroad.129  Fort Lauderdale, on the other hand, will state all 
of the reasons for enactment, including concerns of safety, security, 
 
will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest 
could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Id. at 800. 
 122. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1-6(c) (2018). “[E]nsure 
that the location and concentration of these uses will have a minimal negative impact 
on the surrounding neighborhood.” Id. 
 123. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining other reasons the City 
has for implementing the laws at issue). 
 124. McHenry v. Agnos, No. 92-15123, 1993 WL 8728 (9th Cir. 1993) (“By 
maintaining a system of food establishment permits, the city has leverage to ensure 
that food preparers adhere to minimum standards of health and sanitation.  By 
maintaining a system of special use permits for its parks, the city can prevent the 
abuse of park property and balance the competing uses to which citizens put them.”); 
see also First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 
2011) (finding that spreading the burden of large group feedings is a substantial 
government interest). 
 125. Detweiler, supra note 80, at 726. 
 126. See Saelinger, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 127. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). 
 128. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(C) (2014); FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA. PARK RULES AND REGULATIONS 2.2, 
https://www.fortlauderdale.gov/home/showdocument?id=2908 
[https://perma.cc/S78T-NK89]. 
 129. “Regulations could be written less restrictively by providing for simple permit 
processes, requiring humanitarians to notify park rangers or city authorities of the 
locations of food or water dispensaries, and requiring the volunteers to return and 
retrieve leftover bottles or other refuse.” Cummings, supra note 102, at 453–54. 
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smell, noise, and crowdedness.130  Additionally, the use of the Park is 
not strictly prohibited; rather, requirements must be met before 
access will be granted.131  In other words, filling out the required 
paperwork and fulfilling the necessary obligations is not an onerous 
burden.  Yet, this is not a simple permit process, but instead requires 
the organization to go through a costly, lengthy, and difficult zoning 
application process usually applicable only to development of private 
property.132  Additionally, those legitimate concerns may be achieved 
by requiring less on the part of the organization and its volunteers.133 
Lastly, although only required when the Court uses the time, place, 
and manner test, Fort Lauderdale’s laws did not leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.  It can be argued that 
organizations and their volunteers can utilize local food shelters, soup 
kitchens, or religious organizations to serve food to those in need.  On 
the other hand, it can also be argued that for volunteers to be most 
effective in their outreach, they should be able to meet the homeless 
wherever the homeless are located.134  The park was specifically 
selected because it is a public place and thereby homeless persons 
could easily access it.135  Further, FLFNB picked Stranahan Park for 
the purpose of communicating a significant message, and that 
message would be hindered if FLFNB were required to share food 
 
 130. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining other reasons the City 
has for implementing the laws at issue).  Grace Guarnieri, Why It’s Illegal to Feed 
the Homeless in Cities Across America, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2018, 5:01 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/illegal-feed-criminalizing-homeless-america-782861 
[https://perma.cc/9RA5-VH9A].  Further, even if Fort Lauderdale cited a desire to 
ensure that shared food is prepared according to certain food preparation standards, 
there are no documented cases of food poisoning coming from food that is shared 
with hungry people in public places. Id. 
 131. McHenry v. Agnos, No. 92-15123, 1993 WL 8728, at *2 (9th Cir. 1993) (“These 
ordinances do not foreclose McHenry from alternative forms of communication: 
feeding the homeless in public parks is not the only way of calling attention to their 
plight.  In fact, these ordinances do not foreclose McHenry from feeding the 
homeless or otherwise demonstrating in public parks at all.”); see also First 
Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding 
it to be sufficient that the ordinance allows other activities such as political rallies, 
demonstration, distributions of literature, and any other expressive activities). 
 132. Initial Brief for Appellant, supra note 62, at 40. 
 133. At a minimum, only the Ordinance should apply, not the Ordinance and Rule 
2.2. 
 134. See Homeless People Deserve Food Too, supra note 49; see infra notes 243–
45 and accompanying text. But see Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic 
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 
105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1215 n.276 (1996) (“[A] food provider has considerable power to 
draw the destitute to a location of the provider’s choice.”). 
 135. See supra Section I.D.; Homeless People Deserve Food Too, supra note 49. 
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elsewhere.136  Overall, the arguments for using the First 
Amendment’s right to expressive conduct are strong, and thus the 
courts should be persuaded to find accordingly in future litigation. 
B. First Time for Everything: Applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Homeless Population 
The Fourteenth Amendment states: “ . . . nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”137 
When evaluating particular laws for their constitutionality, under 
both due process and equal protection, the outcome often depends on 
which “level of scrutiny” the Court uses.138  The minimal level of 
review, the “rational basis” test, is deferential to the government: a 
law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.139  The middle tier is termed “intermediate scrutiny”; here, a 
law will be upheld if it is substantially related to an important 
government purpose.140  Lastly, “strict scrutiny” requires that a law 
be necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose to be 
upheld.141  Due to the rigidness of the three tiers of scrutiny, courts 
have sometimes applied enhanced rational basis scrutiny, known as 
“rational basis with bite,” to cases involving historically 
disadvantaged groups that do not fall within the suspect or quasi-
suspect classes or for people who want to associate in a certain way, 
where the law expressly limits such association.142  In footnote four of 
 
 136. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining FLFNB’s intended 
message).  However, this argument is rejected in Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 138. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1239–44 (5th ed. 2015) (e-book). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally Sarah Finnane Hanafin, Legal Shelter: A Case for 
Homelessness as a Protected Status Under Hate Crime Law and Enhanced Equal 
Protection Scrutiny, 40 STETSON L. REV. 435 (2011); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (recognizing that the mentally retarded are different 
due to their misfortunes and finding the law invalid as it does not surpass scrutiny); 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding that when the 
government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the Court 
must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interest advanced and 
the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation). 
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United States v. Carolene Products, the Court set forth two areas 
where heightened scrutiny must be applied.143 
The poor population, and the subgroup of homeless population, is 
currently only afforded the default level of rational basis scrutiny for 
challenges brought against ordinances that criminalize it.144  Given 
that nearly all state action withstands rational basis scrutiny, it is 
unlikely that a court will strike down a law that disproportionately 
affects the homeless on the ground that it is not reasonably related to 
a legitimate state interest.145  Although the Court has articulated that 
economic status does not create a suspect class,146 it has not examined 
the class using the factors147 typically used to determine whether a 
particular group should be treated as such. 148  Many scholars argue 
 
 143. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)  (“1) legislation 
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial 
scrutiny . . . 2) whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”) (emphasis added). 
 144. Hanafin, supra note 142, at 462.  See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 
487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (holding that classifications based on wealth are not suspect 
and noting that the Court has “previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having 
different effects on the wealthy and the poor would on that account alone be 
subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 
(1980) (noting that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“This Court has never held that financial need alone 
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (“[A]t least where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely 
equal advantages.”). 
 145. Liese, supra note 43, at 1432. 
 146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 147. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 148. Id. In other words, 
the Court has not given actual consideration to whether poor people meet 
the suspect class criteria or whether they need judicial protection because 
they have suffered historical discrimination, are unable to protect 
themselves in the political process and find it difficult or sometimes 
impossible to reduce their poverty—especially given recent data 
demonstrating the difficulty of an impoverished child escaping poverty as an 
adult. 
Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual 
Rules of Law, and Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 648 (2008).  In fact, 
the majority of poverty law cases the Court has considered have not directly 
presented discrimination between poor and non-poor people. Id.; see also Maurice R. 
Dyson, Rethinking Rodriguez After Citizens United: The Poor as a Suspect Class in 
High-Poverty Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 1, 13 (2016). See 
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that the poor receive no scrutiny whatsoever, because the poor 
continuously do not receive judicial protection.149  Further, “the 
popularity of anti-homeless ordinances throughout the country 
suggests the creation of the kind of class or caste treatment150 that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”151 
1. Due Process 
The due process test does not dwell on comparisons among 
individuals, as equal protection does, but instead balances the 
importance of the right to the individual against relevant state 
interests.152  Due process is implicated when there is an infringement 
on an individual’s fundamental rights.153  The Court has recognized 
two fundamental rights that may be interpreted as protecting the 
homeless population: the right to vote and the right to travel.154  To 
understand what constitutes a fundamental right, courts evaluate 
whether the right is deeply rooted in history and tradition, and 
whether the law violates basic values implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.155 
First, even though the right to food has not yet been deemed 
fundamental by the Court, sharing food is inherent in the country’s 
 
generally Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection 
Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407 (2010); Jennifer 
Watson, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 501 (2003). 
 149. Nice, supra note 148, at 656; James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court applies “no scrutiny whatsoever and 
treats the provision as if it contained a totally benign, technical economic 
classification”). 
 150. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 151. Hanafin, supra note 142, at 472. 
 152. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Discriminations Against the Poor and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435, 438 (1967).  On the other hand, the 
Court’s equal protection analysis compares individuals to others. Id. 
 153. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  John Hart Ely, 
a widely renowned legal scholar of constitutional law, interpreted the first part of 
footnote four to mean that courts should apply heightened scrutiny when a law 
hinders fundamental rights, including rights essential for political participation. 
 154. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that it 
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause whenever the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee becomes an electoral standard because the “right to vote is too 
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (“[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has 
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.”). 
 155. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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history.156  Sharing food has significant meaning both in the country’s 
history (Thanksgiving) and in major world religions (Passover in the 
Jewish tradition and Communion in the Christian tradition).157  
Furthermore, there is an innate understanding that food is essential to 
staying alive.158 
Second, there is a notion of the concept of “liberty” and “dignity” 
found in a line of cases about sexual freedom and privacy, that can be 
applied to grant protection to the homeless.159  The Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas articulated a right to dignity as free persons as part 
of affording liberty, but did not provide its contours or definition.160  
Furthermore, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges expressed that the 
framers left liberty open to develop through the progressive 
understanding of successive generations.161  Together, these cases 
made a tremendous impact on the evolution of Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence “by shifting the focus of procedural 
review from narrow classifications and nomenclature restrictions to a 
broader focus on the substantive principles and rights at stake.”162  
The Fourteenth Amendment gives protection regardless of the 
articulation of a “fundamental right” or the establishment of 
traditional “moral” support for a particular act.163 
 
 156. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 23. See also Fort Lauderdale Food Not 
Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Like the 
flag, the significance of sharing meals with others dates back millennia.”). 
 157. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 23. 
 158. See A. H. MASLOW, A THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION 6 (Midwest Journal 
Press ed., 1943).  Maslow explains that there is a hierarchy of needs: (1) physiological 
(food, water, warmth, rest), (2) safety (security, safety), (3) belongingness and love 
(intimate relationships, friends), (4) esteem (prestige and feeling of accomplishment), 
and (5) self-actualization (achieving one’s full potential, including creative activities). 
Id.  “Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most pre-potent of all needs.” Id. 
at 7. 
 159. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “The full 
scope of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited 
by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution.” Id. 
 160. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  One scholar explained three 
different concepts of dignity: the dignity of the individual associated with autonomy 
and negative freedom; the positive dignity of maintaining a particular type of life; and 
the dignity of recognition of individual and group differences. See generally Neomi 
Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183 
(2011). 
 161. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 162. Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes 
out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J.  GENDER & L. 355, 398 (2006); see also Luke A. Boso, 
Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1137 (2017). 
 163. Marcus, supra note 162, at 397. 
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Precedent leaves room for interpretation, and thus, the Court 
should interpret its role of preserving individual liberty and human 
dignity to encompass other basic values that underlie society – the 
right to feed others in need and the right to gain access to free 
food.164  Those rights are so basic that the government should not be 
allowed to interfere with them.165  Simply because the Court has 
failed to recognize these rights in the past does not mean it should 
continue to do so.166  A person simply cannot survive without food, 
making this freedom potentially even more immediately necessary 
than the right to sexual freedoms.167  Furthermore, having food to 
sustain oneself is a precondition to the exercise of any kind of 
constitutional liberty. 
2. Equal Protection 
Equal protection is the natural constitutional text that is implicated 
when there is a legal right to certain basic wants and needs which 
stems from a comparison between the burdens and opportunities 
between the relatively rich and poor.168  Equal protection is 
 
 164. See generally Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006).  The Supreme Court has 
often relied on values and rights not expressly found in the Constitution. Id.  Human 
dignity itself is a value not mentioned in the Constitution, yet the Court has routinely 
relied upon it. Id.  Therefore, a constitutional right to food security in the United 
States should be recognized. Id. 
 165. Lee, supra note 22, at 108 (“Dignity is what gives each of us equal standing 
against arbitrary government action that demeans, humiliates[,] and degrades.”). 
 166. Compare Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), with Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938); compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with U.S. 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); compare Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), with 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015); compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); compare Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 429 U.S. 361 (1989), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). But see 
Goodman, supra note 164, at 786 (“During the past thirty-five years, the Court has 
typically reversed lower court decisions favoring the poor.  These rulings reflect that, 
constitutionally speaking, the state need not take affirmative steps to protect and 
preserve human dignity.”). See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 167. See MASLOW, supra note 158 and accompanying text; see also Rao, supra note 
160, at 266–67 (explaining that the Court can undermine dignity by failing to 
recognize the particular needs of certain groups). 
 168. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1969). 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1029 
implicated when a law targets a discrete and insular minority.169  The 
Ordinance and the Rule will likely be deemed facially neutral.170 
When a law is facially neutral, the Court has held that a showing of 
disparate impact is not enough to receive heightened scrutiny.171  It 
must be proven that the government had an underlying 
discriminatory purpose for enactment.172  The Court, in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation, articulated factors that should be considered in 
ascertaining such intent.173  These factors include: (1) the historical 
background of the official action, (2)  the sequence of events, both 
procedural and substantive, that led to the action, and (3) the 
legislative or administrative history of the action.174  If it is found that 
there is a constitutional violation due to discriminatory intent, then 
the Court applies the analysis of the relevant heightened tier of 
scrutiny.175  On the other hand, if there is no constitutional violation 
because the law is facially neutral and no discriminatory intent was 
found, then rational basis scrutiny applies.176 
For the Ordinance and the Rule, it may be difficult to prove 
discriminatory intent.177  However, there is evidence that the topic of 
homelessness was discussed at a recent city public workshop, which 
goes directly to the factors of historical background and sequence of 
events and lends support to the argument that the enactment was 
motivated by an invidious purpose.178  Furthermore, both the 
 
 169. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  This refers to 
the second prong established in footnote four. Id. 
 170. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014); FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., PARK RULES AND REGULATIONS 
2.2, https://www.fortlauderdale.gov/home/showdocument?id=2908 
[https://perma.cc/S78T-NK89]. 
 171. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 172. Id. 
 173. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
 174. Id. at 564. 
 175. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 1634. 
 176. Id. 
 177. The language of both the Ordinance and the Rule are facially neutral because 
they apply universally to anyone or any organization seeking access to the Park. See 
FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. III, § 47-
18.31(C)(2)(c) (2014); FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., PARK RULES AND REGULATIONS 
2.2, https://www.fortlauderdale.gov/home/showdocument?id=2908 
[https://perma.cc/S78T-NK89]. 
 178. See supra note 97.  However, more information regarding the contents of the 
meeting would be needed to make that argument. 
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Ordinance and Rule serve as part of a trend to criminalize the 
homeless to remove them from society.179 
However, due to the weakness of this argument, homeless rights 
activists should argue that precedent should be overturned, and a 
showing of disparate impact should be enough.180  The poor are 
disparately affected by these laws as they are the ones who suffer 
from hunger because of the lack of food sharing events in the city.181  
The Washington v. Davis standard should be relaxed at least in a 
setting where plaintiffs can show governmental neglect of a particular 
group.182 
Opponents of this relaxed standard will argue that cities may have 
a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not 
required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some what others 
can afford.183  In other words, there is no affirmative duty to lift the 
handicaps flowing from differences, and therefore the State cannot 
and should not have to control the disparate impact of its laws.184  
However, Equal Protection is needed because the government is 
taking action that, although it may not be purposeful, exacerbates the 
problem of homelessness.185  Additionally, homelessness is not 
merely an economic class, but rather a state of being.186  Federal 
intervention by the court vis-à-vis Equal Protection is needed to 
 
 179. Saelinger, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 180. Peter Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty 
to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47–48 (1987) (arguing that Washington v. Davis 
needs to be overruled in whole, or in part, or distinguished from this particular type 
of case).  In addition, government action that has a foreseeable negative impact 
should be deemed unconstitutional regardless of the level of scrutiny used to examine 
the state action involved. Id. 
 181. See supra Section I.C.; infra Section III.B. 
 182. When the government acts with either the purpose or effect of disfavoring one 
similarly situated group over another, it creates or reinforces existing social 
hierarchies that tell outgroup members that they are inferior. Boso, supra note 162, at 
1132; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Steward, J., 
concurring) (“Quite apart from the Equal Protection Clause, a state law that 
impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution 
is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law’s purpose or effect is to 
create any classifications”) (emphasis added).  Edelman, supra note 180, at 48 
(“[B]ut, if we are not going to overrule Davis and Arlington Heights, this should be 
one of those circumstances where we do not require proof of intent or purpose.”). 
 183. BRODIE ET AL., supra note 8, at 155. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Dyson, supra note 148, at 44. 
 186. Jason Leckerman, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 540, 564 (2001). 
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protect this class from animus that may not be provable, yet is implicit 
and pervasive.187 
Moreover, although this Note focuses on the laws in just one local 
jurisdiction, Fort Lauderdale, the following analysis is applicable if a 
different food sharing ordinance were to be deemed facially 
discriminatory.  When a law is facially discriminatory, the Court 
considers several factors to determine whether the particular group it 
is referring to should be treated as a quasi-suspect or suspect class 
under Equal Protection.188  These factors include: (1) whether the 
class suffered from a history of discrimination, (2) whether members 
of the group have immutable characteristics, (3) whether the 
classifying trait was relevant to the individual’s ability to contribute to 
society,189 and (4) whether the class was politically powerless in its 
ability to attract the attention of lawmakers.190  A class that meets all 
four criteria would be considered suspect and deserving of heightened 
scrutiny.191 
First, homeless persons have been subject to a history of unfair 
treatment by the political majority, which is evidenced by the plethora 
of anti-homeless ordinances targeting their day-to-day activities.192  
Further, tax abatements and exclusionary zoning policies confine 
poor people within an “invisible wall.”193 
Additionally, poverty is not a choice and is therefore immutable.194  
A counter argument is that poverty is not an immutable characteristic 
due to the fact that a person can, over time, work their way out of it.  
But that argument does not reference recent studies that evidence 
 
 187. Dyson, supra note 148, at 44. 
 188. Id. at 12–13; Rose, supra note 148, at 420. 
 189. This factor refers to stereotypes and stigma surrounding the group that would 
impact its role in society. 
 190. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see also Rose, supra note 148, at 
420; Dyson, supra note 148, at 12–13; Bertrall L. Ross, Measuring Political Power: 
Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 333 (2016). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra Section I.C.; see also generally Samantha Holloway, Homeless, 
Hungry, and Targeted: A Look at the Validity of Food-Sharing Restrictions in the 
United States, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733 (2017); Nancy Wright, Not in Anyone’s 
Backyard: Ending the “Contest of Nonresponsibility” and Implementing Long-Term 
Solutions to Homelessness, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 163 (1995). See also 
Hanafin, supra note 142, at 472 (“If equal protection under the law is to mean 
anything, surely it cannot stand for the ideal of targeting the most vulnerable groups 
in society and criminalizing the activities that sustain their very existence.”). 
 193. Watson, supra note 148, at 517. 
 194. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text; Hanafin, supra note 142; 
Holloway, supra note 192. 
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that poverty is usually not a choice of the person it affects and hence 
the poor person is deserving of sympathy.195 
Third, there is a societal stigmatization of the poor, including the 
indifference about their needs.196  Furthermore, government policies 
contribute to the stigma as the attempts to criminalize them in effect 
demean them.197 
Lastly, this segment of the population unfortunately is politically 
powerless, as they are underrepresented in decision-making 
councils.198  This is because the homeless do not have the ability to 
vote.199  Therefore, they are perceived as an unimportant voting bloc 
and subject to targeting.200  All of these conditions encourage giving 
this segment of the population at least some form of heightened 
scrutiny to which the government would have to prove that the law is 
more than rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.201 
To receive rational basis with bite scrutiny, the Court looks to 
whether there is animus behind the law.202  The City will argue that it 
has an interest in protecting the peace, health, safety and property of 
its citizens.203  However, there is not only a general history of actions 
taken to criminalize the homeless,204 but also there was a city 
 
 195. See supra note 13–25 and accompanying text. 
 196. Ross, supra note 190, at 344.  Many homeless individuals are easily identifiable 
by their clothes, appearance, and conduct, which visibly marks the homeless as a 
distinct group. Watson, supra note 148, at 517. 
 197. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795 (2011). 
 198. Ross, supra note 190, at 344. See Leckerman, supra note 186, at 565 
(explaining that the poor lack financial resources to obtain access to many of the 
most effective means of persuasion). 
 199. Factors include the lack of a legal address, knowledge of how to register, and 
access to transportation or telephones. Christine L. Bella & David L. Lopez, Quality 
of Life – At What Price?: Constitutional Challenges to Laws Adversely Impacting the 
Homeless, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 89, 99 (1994).  All of these factors make 
it virtually impossible for the homeless to vote even though the U.S. Supreme Court 
has deemed a homeless person’s right to vote fundamental. Id. 
 200. Holloway, supra note 192, at 52; Bella & Lopez, supra note 199. 
 201. These factors prove that when using the literal definition of “discrete and 
insular” the homeless are an isolated and detached group. Watson, supra note 148, at 
516. 
 202. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  The Court has found animus in 
cases involving the mentally retarded, certain living arrangements, sexual orientation 
and alien children. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(recognizing that the mentally retarded are different due to their misfortunes and 
finding the law invalid as it does not surpass rational basis scrutiny because it 
appeared to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Hanafin, supra note 142. 
 203. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 204. Saelinger, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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workshop and the Ordinance had not been enforced since 2015 until 
after that workshop took place.205  Hence, there is apparent animus 
on the part of the government, and the laws should not be found to be 
more than rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.206  
Regardless of the true reasons for passing the anti-homeless 
legislation, the state statutes and municipal ordinances that purport to 
advance these interests  may very well be ineffective.  Therefore, the 
Court must not consider the laws rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest.207 
Overall, “relative impecuniousness appears to be joining race and 
national ancestry to compose a complex of traits which, if detectible 
as a basis of officially sanctioned disadvantage, render such 
disadvantage ‘invidious’ or ‘suspect.’”208  By not recognizing the poor 
as a suspect class, the Court is serving as an accomplice to the 
continuation of cyclical poverty caused by no fault of the person it 
affects the most.209 
III. PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO SHARE FOOD IS NECESSARY 
Section III.A. compels future courts to interpret the Constitution 
by applying the whole-text approach to protect the homeless 
population.  Section III.B. explains the important policy benefits of 
safeguarding the homeless.  Section III.C. argues that the United 
 
 205. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 206. Holloway, supra note 192.  Food sharing laws create undifferentiated 
disability on homeless communities. Id.  Additionally, by making it illegal or difficult 
for those who attempt to feed the homeless, there is an immediate negative impact on 
the homeless. Id.  Those food providers are sometimes the only access a homeless 
individual may have to safe food for extended periods of time. Id.  These reasons 
make it clear that there would be no reason for the City to enact this type of law, but 
for having prejudice against the group. 
 207. Liese, supra note 43, at 1433.  “If the constitutional conception of equal 
protection of the laws means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.” Wright, supra note 192, at 197. 
 208. Michelman, supra note 168, at 19. 
 209. Shayan H. Modarres, The Fourteenth Amendment Isn’t “Broke”: Why 
Wealth Should Be a Suspect Classification Under the Equal Protection Clause, 3 
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 171, 196 (2012); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121 (2009); see also supra notes 13–20 
and accompanying text; James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 146 (1971) (Marshall, J., 
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States’ participation in international agreements lends support to such 
protection. 
A. Finding Protection in the Constitution as a Whole 
The worst way to deal with the problem of homelessness in the 
United States is to make it a crime in an attempt to fix it.210  The first 
step to protecting the homeless population is simple: courts must turn 
to the U.S. Constitution.  The solution to this problem is not 
embedded in a single clause, but rather throughout the Constitution 
as a whole.211 
Constitutional norms embodied throughout the entirety of the text 
are deserving of protection.212  Precedent establishes that the Court 
has the power to interpret the Constitution to protect rights that were 
not explicitly enumerated.213  Not everything in the Constitution is 
textually itemized and specified; therefore, some of what is covered 
by the Constitution is implied rather than expressed.214  This stems 
from the fact that “it is a Constitution we are expounding” and 
therefore not all rights are explicit.215  This gives rise to the idea that 
reading the document as a whole helps “construe ambiguous 
[f]ounding language so as to redeem the vision of later amendments 
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 213. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; Eve E. Garrow & Jack 
Day, Strengthening the Human Right to Food, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 275, 287 (2017); 
Fallon, supra note 6, at 1193 (“Implicit norms of our constitutional practice call for a 
constitutional interpreter to assess and reassess the arguments in the various 
categories in an effort to understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the 
same result.”). 
 214. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1740 
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to look beyond enumeration. Id. 
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that are more inclusive in both process and result.”216  Thus, to 
modify Marshall’s interpretation, it is a single, coherent 
Constitution that we are expounding.217 
Food sharing regulations require protection because they give rise 
to constitutional infirmities.  First, the expressed purpose of the 
Constitution was the desire to “insure domestic tranquility”218 and 
“promote the general welfare.”219  Hence, the Constitution protects 
the homeless population on its face and must be applied to do so.  
This is because “[t]he desire to insure that diligent, unemployable 
citizens will at least have the bare minimums required for existence, 
without which our expressed fundamental constitutional rights and 
liberties frequently cannot be exercised and therefore become 
meaningless.”220 
Further, the Declaration of Independence established an 
unalienable right – the right to life.221  Though the positive right to 
life is not recognized in the Constitution, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect individuals from being “deprived of 
life . . . without due process of law.”222  The right to life, as understood 
when interpreting historical context and these provisions together, is 
foundational to the protection of our basic human rights.223  All other 
human rights are meaningless when the right to life is not 
guaranteed.224  To effectuate the right to life, a person must have 
access to free food, as food is essential to sustain life.225 
To continue, the Ordinance and the Rule are seemingly neutral 
general laws; yet, they have a significantly harmful effect on a 
historically powerless group.  The laws have unconstitutional 
implications of a homeless person’s right to expressive conduct, due 
process, and equal protection.226  These different constitutional rights 
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respectively protect the right to both food sharing and access to free 
food.  However, homeless advocates have yet to successfully convince 
the courts that these constitutional doctrines should extend for the 
protection of homeless individuals.227  But, to read the Constitution in 
segments would be a disservice to this portion of the population that 
clearly demands protection.228  Together, the different clusters 
support the rights to both share food and have access to free food.  
The Court is uniquely situated with the power to interpret the 
Constitution as including a positive, justiciable right to adequate food 
— or at least to block the state from interfering with private efforts to 
provide such food — and it should.229 
B. The Pragmatic Basis for Protecting the Homeless 
The homeless population suffers from immense hardship to begin 
with and restricting food sharing merely exacerbates the problems.230  
It is important for the courts to correct the falsehoods231 regarding 
homelessness and seriously consider the policy implications 
surrounding food sharing ordinances.  Doing so will prove the 
necessity of protection for the homeless.  The Court has the 
opportunity to change its negative response to this segment of the 
population and hopefully it will trickle down throughout society. 
Some individuals wrongly believe that the act of sharing food 
enables people to remain homeless.232  Importantly, however, 
restricting access to free, safe food does nothing to end homelessness, 
because the problem is rooted in the lack of access to public 
housing.233  In fact, providing the homeless with easy access to free, 
safe food greatly increases their chances of both survival and removal 
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from unwanted public areas.234  There are an infinite number of 
stress-factors that homeless persons must face every day.235  For 
example, a homeless person must think about “shelter, nutrition, 
health concerns, and employment as well as fears of being vulnerable 
to violence and arrest.”236  Thus, if homeless persons can depend on 
consistent, reliable food sharing programs, then they have a guarantee 
that at the very least their most basic needs are met.237  This would 
allow them to exert more energy on improving other aspect of their 
lives.238 
Additionally, sometimes these laws are premised on the belief that 
the homeless already do, in fact, have access to food resources.239  In 
2017, fifty-eight percent of food insecure households participated in at 
least one of the major federal food assistance programs.240  But 
“participation in these federal programs is just one indicator of how 
great the need is.”241  Almost half of the hungry population does not 
use the federal programs, and even those who are using the federal 
benefits are still participating in non-profit food sharing events, hence 
proving that current services, where used, are likely inadequate.242 
Further, because of the demand for these programs, organizations 
should be able to give out food in public spaces. Requiring a different 
location may make it impossible for the homeless to gain access to the 
free food, as many homeless persons must travel long distances to 
reach shelters, or they may be unable to reach the shelters at all due 
to “work conflicts, illness, disability, or lack of adequate public 
transportation.”243  Furthermore, “a need so basic must be addressed 
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in any way it can be,244 without deference to the location of the 
service resources.”245  Overall, meals should not come quid pro 
quo.246  Therefore, food sharing organizations should be allowed to 
provide their services, and more cities should repeal this type of 
ordinance. 
To clarify, this Note does not argue that the government’s actions 
make the poor worse off; it argues that the means chosen to deal with 
a legitimate problem are both insufficient and ineffective.247  
Research has indicated that providing individuals with certain 
services, such as housing, counseling, and food, would cost less than 
incarcerating those individuals.248  When police arrest or cite 
homeless individuals, the resulting police records make it even more 
difficult for those individuals to find employment.249  Additionally, 
when police force the homeless to leave certain parts of a city, they 
almost always move them further from the social service centers that 
can potentially help them.250  Therefore, cities are exacerbating, 
rather than resolving, the problem of homelessness.251  As scholars 
have noted, homelessness will not self-correct, and the criminalization 
of homelessness is merely a stopgap measure that fails to engage with 
root causes of the problem.252 
C. International Agreements as a Justification for Domestic Action 
It is perplexing as to how all food sharing ordinances have not been 
repealed, as the United States federal government and its agencies 
seem to disagree with general methods that criminalize the 
homeless.253  The U.S. Interagency Council on Homeless recognized 
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in a 2012 report that these methods may also violate international 
human rights laws of the Convention Against Torture and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.254  Further, 
during the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
process, the U.S. expressed a commitment to pursue alternatives to 
criminalization of homelessness.255  While America stands against 
criminalization of the homeless internationally, the actions of several 
cities directly conflict with that belief, and hence, a change is 
necessary. 
Furthermore, the right to food is an international human right 
recognized in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.256  This basic human right has been “explicitly addressed in 
over 120 instruments of international law since 1920, including major 
international agreements.”257  However, the United States has signed 
but not ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
therefore is not bound to adhere to it.258  International law that does 
not undermine the U.S. Constitution should be used to supplement 
the established, baseline constitutional right with more progressive 
ones.259  Additionally, considering the important role that 
international law has played in shaping issues of social justice and 
human rights over the last few decades, it should play an instructive 
role in strengthening the right to food and the right to share it in the 
United States.260 
CONCLUSION 
Food sharing ordinances have far-reaching consequences for the 
homeless population.  This Note urges future courts to find food 
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sharing ordinances unconstitutional by looking at the Constitution as 
a whole as opposed to individual clauses.  Doing so would protect the 
homeless population at large and ultimately save lives.  Even without 
relying on the Constitution, this Note compels the courts to consider 
the myriad of harmful policy implications of such ordinances on 
homeless individuals.  Further, the country’s actions with regard to 
the right to food internationally exemplify its core belief in the 
necessity of protecting it; hence, the court must defend the right 
domestically as well. 
 
